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NOTES
THE CASE OF THE TRANQUILIZED DEFENDANT*
Is a mentally ill accused who is able to understand the pro-
ceedings and to assist in his defense, due only to tranquilizing
medication, legally competent to stand trial? The Louisiana
Supreme Court has not yet answered this question. Should it be
decided that such persons are not to be tried because their ca-
pacity is due to the effect of drugs, many defendants who may
be totally innocent of the charges against them are faced with
the possibility of spending the rest of their lives in an institution
for the criminally insane. The purpose of this Note is to review
the Louisiana statutory authority in the light of cases from
other jurisdictions in an attempt to clarify the legal issues pre-
sented by the plight of the tranquilized defendant.
The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure provides that in-
capacity to proceed exists when "as a result of a mental disease
or defect, a defendant presently lacks the capacity to understand
the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense."' The
defendant's incapacity to proceed may be raised at any time by
the defense, the district attorney, or the court itself.2 When
raised, the prosecution is halted until the defendant is found
mentally competent to proceed. 3 If the defendant is found to be
incompetent, the proceedings are suspended and the defendant
is committed to a state mental institution for care and treatment
as long as the mental incapacity continues.4 If the court subse-
quently determines that the defendant has regained mental
capacity, the prosecution is resumed.5
* This Note is condensed from the writer's research report submitted
for the LSU Law School's fieldwork In modern social legislation project.
In this program, law students worked with social agencies during the sum-
ber of 1967 to observe their activities and to assess the impact of social and
welfare laws. The project was financed by the American Bar Association
through the Ford Foundation, and was directed by Mrs. Leila Cutshaw.
Appreciation is expressed to the administrators of the East Louisiana State
Hospital, particularly to Dr. E. H. Metz, Clinical Director of the Forensic
Division and Dr. C. B. Scrignar, Consultant to the Hospital for their assist-
ance and cooperation.
1. LA. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 641 (1966). See generally id. arts.
641-649. The issue of competency to stand trial should be distinguished from
the defense of insanity. The latter is concerned with the mental state of
the defendant at the time of the commission of the offense, not at the time
of the trial. See id. arts. 650-658.
2. Id. art. 642.
3. Id.
4. Id. art. 648.
5. Id.
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Both the federal and state constitutions assure the accused
the right to a speedy trial.6 Certainly the delay of a trial be-
cause of the defendant's mental incapacity to proceed would not
be a denial of his constitutional rights.7 But is it a denial of the
accused's constitutional rights to refuse to try him on the ground
that his sanity is synthetically induced?
Psychotropic drugs were introduced little more than a de-
cade ago with an explosive suddenness unprecedented in psy-
chiatric therapy.8 Many patients suffering from protracted psy-
chosis - formerly unresponsive to psychiatric treatment - are
now being effectively treated and returned to society.9 The anti-
psychotic drugs belong to a group called phenothiazines, of
which "Thorzine" and "Compazine" are the most common. These
drugs, known as the major tranquilizers several years ago, can
reduce hallucinations, delusions, and other abnormalities in the
mentally ill. However, they do not otherwise affect the cortex-
the "thinking" part of the brain. The mental clarity or conscious-
ness of the person remains unchanged. 0 In effect, they cause a
remission of the psychosis; if the drugs are discontinued, this
latent psychosis will return. Therefore, after-care clinics, pro-
viding psychotherapy and tranquilizing medication for released
patients, have been established.1 '
No case has been found which squarely rules whether a
defendant who is "synthetically sane"-whose functional sanity
is sustained solely by continued medication-is legally compe-
tent to stand trial. The Supreme Court of Iowa was faced with
an analogous situation, however, in Sewell v. Lainson.12 The de-
fendant, a narcotics addict, appealed his conviction on the ground
that at the time of his guilty plea he had been under the influ-
ence of a 31/ grain dose of morphine provided by the sheriff.
The court took judicial notice of the fact that a narcotics addict
is nervous and ill when denied the drug, and approaches a nor-
6. U.S. CONST., amend. IV; LA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
7. See State v. Bradford, 219 La. 489, 53 So.2d 244 (1951); State v. Theard,
203 La. 1026, 14 So.2d 824 (1943).
8. Odegard, Pattern of Discharge for Norwegian Psychiatric Hospitals
Before and After the Introduction of the Psychotropic Drugs. 120 AM. J.
PsYcH. 772 (1964).
9. See Scrignar, Tranquilizers and the Psychotic Defendant, 53 A.B.A.3.
43 (1967).
10. POPULAR SCMNCE, Feb. 1963, at 72-73.
11. Interview with C. B. Scrignar, M.D., Medical Consultant, East Lou-
isiana State Hospital, Forensic Division, August 15, 1967.
12. 244 Iowa 555, 57 N.W.2d 556 (1953).
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mal state only when he has access to it. The court found that
the defendant had failed to show that the effects of the drug had
had an adverse effect on his ability to participate in his defense
and refused to assume prejudice on speculation. The court rea-
soned that had the drug not been furnished to the petitioner he
might well have argued that his guilty plea had been entered
while he was not mentally competent because of physical and
nervous sufferings occasioned by the deprivation of his habitual
narcotics.'3
While there are obvious differences between an addict who
uses drugs to maintain his "normal" toxic condition and a psy-
chotic who must use medication to sustain his functional sanity,
the legal issue is the same: regardless of whether the accused has
taken drugs or medication, is he able to understand the proceed-
ings against him and to assist counsel in his defense? In United
States v. Tom, defendant claimed that due to the influence of
drugs he had been unable to understand the nature of the charges
against him or to assist in his defense. The Second Circuit held
that there was no reason why the use of narcotics per se rendered
a defendant incompetent to proceed. Whether or not the defen-
dant was competent was a matter of fact as to which the peti-
tioner had the burden of proof. After noting that there was no
showing that the petitioner acted abnormally or appeared affected
during the trial, the court held that the petitioner had failed to
sustain the burden.
A recent Louisiana case, State v. Burrows,15 deals with, but
does not decide, the question here discussed. Shortly after the
defendant's indictment, a lunacy commission reported that he
13. The cases here discussed should be distinguished from those situa-
tions in which the accused is prejudiced because he is on drugs or medica-
tion at the time of the trial. For example, in State v. Murphy, 56 Wash. 2d
761, 355 P.2d 323 (1960), the defendant (not psychotic) was tense and nervous
prior to trial. On the morning of the trial the trustee gave the accused
three cold pills which ccntained tranquilizers. At his trial the defendant
appeared casual, cool, and totally unconcerned with the gravity of his can-
didly admitted offense. His conviction was reversed and remanded for re-
trial. See also Lobaugh v. State, 226 Ind. 548, 82 N.E.2d 247 (1948); Carter
v. State, 198 Miss. 503, 21 So.2d 404 (1945). It is certainly agreed that, pre-
suming the defendants were actually affected by medication, these decisions
are just. But such decisions should not be broadened, due to a misunder-
standing of the effect of psychotropic medication, to all situations where
the defendant is on drugs at the time of the trial. According to Dr. C. B.
Scrignar a user of psychotropic medication would suffer the prejudicial
effects of the defendant in the Murphy case in only the rarest of instances.
14. 340 F. 2d 127 (2d Cir. 1965).
15. 250 La. 658, 198 So.2d 393 (1967).
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was insane and lacked capacity to stand trial. The court found
that the defendant was incompetent and he was committed to
the East Louisiana State Hospital, where he remained under
treatment until, following repeated requests from the hospital
administration, he was returned for a re-evaluation. Upon re-
hearing, the court found the defendant sane. Defendant excepted
to this ruling. The trial judge, recognizing the question of syn-
thetic sanity to be a novel one, certified it as follows: "Is sanity
induced by drugs legal sanity sufficient to enable a defendant to
stand trial, or should a defendant who is presently sane, with
the administration of drugs, be compelled to remain in a mental
institution for the rest of his life . .. ?"16 The Supreme Court
did not decide the issue whether the defendant should stand
trial. It held that a sanity determination is merely an interlocu-
tory decree, and thus not appealable.
Whether it is the state or the defendant who seeks to avoid
trial the legal issue is the same. It is submitted that the position
that synthetic sanity is not sufficient legal sanity is due to a
basic misunderstanding of the nature of chemotherapy. Dr. F. H.
Metz, Clinical Director of the Forensic Division at the East Lou-
isiana State Hospital, describes the effect of tranquilizing drugs
as follows:
". .. I believe it is highly significant that the courts and
the district attorney and all concerned should recognize
that tranquilizers or anti-psychotic or anti-anxiety medi-
cation . . . are not drugs in the sense that they 'drug' or
cloud the consciousness or senses of an individual, and that
they are not habit-forming or addicting and are not classed
as sedatives like the barbituates, and they are not classed
as narcotics. Certainly the district attorney will want to
note this and thus may prevent the possibility of an accused
or convicted defendant seeking relief . . . on the grounds
that he was drugged or 'doped' or sedated at the time of his
earlier hearing or trial.'17
Defense counsel argued in Burrows that the experts have
developed a new type of individual who is actually insane but
16. 198 So.2d 393, 394 (La. 1967).
17. Letter of July 18, 1966, to Judge John A. Dixon of the First Judicial
District Court, Parish of Caddo.
seems sane while under medication. They argued that this syn-
thetic sanity was not legally sufficient to warrant trying a man
for his life. Counsel claimed that to try the defendant would
be tantamount to construing the code article on competency to
read "able to understand the proceedings against him and to
assist in his own defense, while under the influence of drugs."
Such a conclusion does not logically follow. To argue that one
who must take medication is not really sane seems equivalent
to asserting that one who wears corrective glasses cannot really
see. The statute, furthermore, does not require that the accused
shall have never been insane, or that he must be sane indepen-
dent of medication. It demands an effective condition; how that
condition is brought about should properly be left to the accom-
plishments of the medical and psychiatric professions.
In State v. Genna 8 the Louisiana Supreme Court approved
the following test for competence:
"The test of present insanity which will prevent a trial in
a criminal action is whether the person is mentally compe-
tent to make a rational defense. . . .A person arraigned
for a crime, who is capable understanding the nature and
object of the proceedings against him, and who comprehends
his own condition in reference to it, and can conduct his
defense in a rational manner, is to be deemed sane for the
purposes of being tried, although on some other subjects
his mind be unsound."19
The question, then, is, does the defendant's mental condition
and capacity meet this test. If it does, the fact that the defen-
dant is taking medication should not preclude his trial.20 The
objective application of this standard will enable the state to
proceed against a defendant who is seeking to avoid or postpone
trial and will not prevent the defendant who wants to stand
trial from becoming the "forgotten man" of the law.
Madison Callaway Moseley
18. 163 La. 701, 112 So. 655 (1927).
19. Id. at 718, 112 So. at 661, citing 1 WHARTON & STILL, MEDICAL JURIS-
PRUDENCE § 206, at 210 (5th ed. 1905).
20. Were the courts to approve the trial of the tranquilized defendant,
the question might arise whether an accused could avoid trial simply by
refusing to take the medication. Analogous situations indicate that he could
not. See, e.g., People v. Rogers, 150 Cal. App. 2d 403, 309 P.2d 949 (1957).
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